

Since all cognition of reality reduces to judgments i.e., to interpretation of sensation in concepts, and since cognition can be distinguished as a direct and indirect one, the judgement also can be divided into a direct and an indirect one. The direct one viz perception, is a synthesis between a sensation and a conception, the indirect judgement is a synthesis between a sensation and two concepts.

Perceptual judgement has the form, e.g., 'this is blue' or 'this is smoke'. An indirect, inferential judgement has the form 'this is smoke produced by fire' or 'there is some fire because there is smoke'.

Having excluded from the realm of ultimate reality every bit of imagination, having reduced it to point-instants which include no synthesis, the Buddhist logicians landed in the same difficulty which must befall every system which endeavours to establish a difference in kind between two sources of knowledge : the passive receptivity of the senses and the spontaneous production of imagination.

Both realms, the transcendental unimagined reality and the imagined empirical one, are dissimilar. There is between them no other connection than a causal one.

The point-instants are points of efficiency, they possess the capacity to stimulate the understanding to construct in imagination illusive pictures which are mistaken for reality itself.

This case of causality is a glaring challenge to the prejudice shared by all realistic systems that the effect must be similar to its cause. Here, the effect is absolutely dissimilar to its cause. There is between the point-instant and the image or conception, a conformity (sarupya) or correspondence but it is a kind of similarity between things absolutely dissimilar.

The Buddhist law of causation as interdependence is consistent with dissimilarity between cause and effect. The corresponding image arises in functional dependence on a moment of sensation and a moment of objective reality.

We have the judgements 'this is blue' and 'this is not yellow'. The source of this definiteness is the sense of sameness. The senses cannot produce this definiteness by themselves because the pure element of sensation is the same in all cognitions. How could pure sensation by itself possess the force of distinguishing every separate cognition from all others ?

If a given pure sensation could produce a cognition of the presence of a blue patch and could not produce a cognition of yellow, it would possess the force of producing distinctness. But since as pure sensation, it is common to all cognitions and always the same, it is not the cause producing distinctness.

On the other hand, coordination is not always the same. It is therefore the cause producing the distinctness and clearness of every single cognition. It is the image of

blue, its sameness with other blue objects, which produces clearness and distinctness. Thus we become aware that it is not yellow or any other color.